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It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees at risk in 
their home countries. If this is true, perhaps states have a right to deport refugees once their lives are no 
longer at risk in their home countries. I raise three types of arguments against this claim, and in support 
of refugees' right to remain. Citizenship-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to obtain 
citizenship, and with citizenship comes the right to remain. Plans-based arguments hold that refugees 
have a right to plan their lives, and they will struggle to plan without the right to remain. Reciprocity-
based arguments hold that refugees have a right to reciprocal relationships with citizens, far easier if they 
















It is widely accepted that states have a right to control who enters their territory, 
deciding how many workers join the economy, how many residents join the citizenry, 
and how many students, patients, and pedestrians join the state’s schools, hospitals, 
and roads. Even those who insist that states are obligated to provide citizenship to 
long-term residents often accept that states have a right to determine who can become 
a long-term resident, and so who will be entitled to citizenship later.1  
 
It is also widely accepted that states, although holding the right to control 
immigration, must make exceptions for refugees. States do not have a right to turn 
away those whose life or basic liberty will be at risk if they return home, including 
those fleeing persecution, famine and civil war.2 
 
If states have a general right to control immigration, but refugees are an exception 
because their lives or liberty are at risk, perhaps states can require that refugees return 
home once their lives or liberty are no longer at risk. This logic, supported by some 
philosophers (Hathaway and Neve, 1997 and Miller, 2005, pp. 202-203), is the norm in a 
range of countries. In 2008 Ghanaian Minister of Interior Kwamena Bartels announced 
that Liberian refugees would be required to return home, as the Liberian Civil War 
had ended (Omata, 2011). In 2013 the Kenyan government insisted that Somali refugees 
begin repatriating, including those who had lived in Kenya most of their adult lives 
(Hamilton, 2013). In 2016 the German government announced that Syrian refugees 
would be required to return home once the war in Syria ended (Rinke, 2016). 
 
This article objects to these policies and defends the claim that refugees have a right to 
remain even when returning is safe. After setting out some assumptions in Section 1, 
Section 2 presents and rejects four arguments which attempt to explain why refugees 
have a right to remain. The first three arguments relate to citizenship: refugees have a 
right to eventually obtain citizenship in their adopted states, and with citizenship 
comes the right to remain.  The fourth argument relates to plans: refugees have a right 
to plan for the future, and planning requires the ability to remain. Section 3 presents a 
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more promising argument: refugee have a right to remain because they have a right 
to enter reciprocal relationships with citizens. Such reciprocity is easier to develop if 
citizens are certain that refugees will not be deported once returning is safe.  
 
1. Some assumptions 
Throughout the article I will assume that states usually have a right to control 
immigration, and consider why refugees still have a right to remain even if this 
assumption is true. However, nothing in my argumentation is dependent on this 
assumption: if one supports open borders, this too is compatible with my 
argumentation. My goal is to demonstrate why supporting states’ right to control 
immigration needn’t preclude refugees’ right to remain.  
 
If refugees have a right to remain, I assume this means states have a weighty moral 
reason to provide refugees the legal status to remain, and states are not morally 
permitted to revoke this status whenever they desire that refugees leave. In other 
words, states are not permitted to invoke their general right to control immigration as 
the sole justification for requiring that refugees eventually leave. This is consistent 
with the claim that there may be other justifications for requiring that refugees leave. 
For example, if providing refugees the right to remain created detrimental economic 
strife for the host country, such that citizens could not obtain basic necessities for 
survival, perhaps citizens’ right to survival could trump refugees’ right to remain.3   
 
This is a fairly standard understanding of ‘rights’ within debates on immigration 
ethics. For example, Joseph Carens and Kieran Oberman claim that all individuals 
have a right to cross borders, but stipulate that this right could be curtailed if it 
somehow undermined citizens’ access to basic necessities (Carens, 1987, p. 260; Oberman, 
2016, p. 33).4 Even those who claim refugees have a right to asylum might use the word 
‘right’ in this non-absolute sense. For example, if a state learned that accepting millions 
of refugees would overwhelm basic provisions for all, then the rights to basic 
provisions could outweigh refugees’ rights to asylum.  
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In discussing refugees’ right to remain, I assume that refugees include all those who 
the UN claims should be given asylum. These are individuals who have a well-
founded fear of persecution in their home countries (1951 Convention). I also assume 
that refugees include those fleeing for their lives or basic liberty, whether their lives or 
liberty are at risk from food insecurity, a natural disaster, or general violence.5  I 
assume that coercing such ‘survival migrants’ (Betts, 2010) to leave is unethical if the 
state has the capacity to accept such individuals, and if accepting these individuals is 
the only way to ensure that their rights to life and liberty are protected. This claim is 
supported not only by philosophers who believe in open borders, such as Joseph 
Carens (1987), but by those who defend states’ right to exclude immigrants, such as 
Matthew Gibney (2004), David Miller (2005), and even some states themselves (Betts, 
2010).6  As such, it serves as a ‘minimal ethical standard’ (Hidalgo, 2015) for which 
individuals have a right to asylum, leaving open the question of whether these 
individuals must eventually return home.   
 
2. Four arguments and their limits 
There are four promising arguments for why refugees have a right to remain, but all 
four have limitations.  
 
2.1 State membership  
This argument begins with the premise that all individuals have a right to membership 
in a state. An individual is no longer a member of her home state if her membership 
has been repudiated. Her membership can be repudiated when a core feature of her 
identity is rejected by her home state, and this can occur if she is persecuted because 
of her religion, race, politics or social membership. She therefore has right to 
membership in a new state, rather than mere temporary asylum. For her to be a true 
member she must eventually obtain citizenship. Once she is a citizen, she has a right 
to remain even if returning to her home country is safe (Cherem, 2016, p. 191-192; Lister, 
2013, p. 662 and 669-670; Walzer, 1983, p. 48).  
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One problem with this State Membership Argument is that a person can be persecuted 
but remain a member of the state, so long as they are persecuted by independent 
militias who do not represent the state. Such a person’s bond with their government 
remains intact if their government is doing everything to stop the militias’ actions. 
Once the government stops the militias, refugees can perhaps return home.  
 
One proponent of the State Membership Argument, Matthew Lister, addresses this 
objection. He argues that when militias target individuals, the militias usurp the state’s 
authority, essentially becoming the state. The state therefore repudiates victims’ 
membership, because the state has become the militias engaging in persecution (Lister, 
2013, p. 662). For example, when Hutu militias targeted Tutsi citizens during the 
Rwandan Genocide, the power of the original Rwandan government became usurped, 
and the true state was represented by Hutu militias. The state – represented by the 
Hutu militias – repudiated the membership of Tutsi residents, and these residents 
therefore had a right to citizenship elsewhere, and so a right to remain elsewhere. 
 
One reason to reject this argument is that it rests on a view of the state rejected by 
many refuges themselves. When refugees flee a militia that has usurped the 
government, a separate government may remain in exile. When refugees feel a strong 
bond to this government-in-exile, and feel this government is the true representative 
of the state, they may plan to return to their state when this government-in-exile 
regains power. From refugees’ own perspective, their bond with their state remains 
strong. Just as those fleeing famine or natural disasters still maintain a bond with their 
state, even if the government is powerless to stop the famine and natural disaster, 
refugees fleeing militias can maintain a bond with their state, even if the government 
is powerless to stop the militias. If they maintain a bond, and feel they remain 
members of their state, perhaps they can be required to return once their original 
government becomes reinstated.  
 
Even if one rejects this response, the State Membership Argument is still limited in 
scope: it does not explain why those fleeing conditions other than persecution have a 
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right to remain. Those fleeing natural disasters or general violence are not necessarily 
persecuted, and so their membership has not been repudiated. They therefore do not 
have a right to citizenship elsewhere, according to this argument. If this is true, then it 
seems many individuals who are accepted as refugees – including Syrian refugees 
fleeing general violence, or Ethiopian refugees fleeing famine – do not have a right to 
remain. If we wish to find an argument in support of these refugees’ right to remain, 
another argument is necessary.  
 
2.2 Justice  
This argument holds that that all individuals have a right to citizenship in a state that 
follows minimal principles of justice. A state that persecutes minorities fails to follow 
minimal principles of justice, but so does a state forcing individuals to flee an unjust 
war it began, or a famine it is responsible for. Such a state’s refugees have a right to 
citizenship in a just state, and so a just state ought to provide them both asylum and 
citizenship. At the very least, it cannot deny citizenship based solely on its general 
right to control immigration.7  
 
Moreover, even when a host state is not entirely just, it ought to provide citizenship to 
refugees if it is more just than the state from which refugees fled. For example, when 
Rwandan refugees fled to Uganda in 1994, Uganda was a more just state than Rwanda 
at that moment, even if a less just state than, say, Ghana. If Uganda could provide 
citizenship to refugees without incurring significant costs, and no other state was 
willing to provide this citizenship, it had a duty to provide citizenship. With 
citizenship comes the right to remain, and so Rwandan refugees had the right to 
remain.  
 
While this Justice Argument is seemingly promising, it includes a controversial 
premise. It presumes individuals have a right to citizenship in a just state. It may be 
that individuals merely have a right to residency in a just state, or basic necessities in 
some state. If one holds that the right to asylum is merely the right to access residency 
in a just state, or basic necessities in some state, then refugees do not have a right to 
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obtain citizenship after they have fled. They merely have a right to asylum until their 
home state becomes just, or until they can obtain basic necessities in their home state.  
 
Moreover, even if refugees do have a right to citizenship in a just state, many refugees 
are fleeing states that are perfectly just. For example, those fleeing natural or economic 
disasters might find their lives threatened from destitution, and so are refugees 
according to a range of views, but they are not always fleeing an unjust state if their 
state is attempting to protect its citizens lives, and simply lacks the resources to do so. 
Similarly, a refugee leaving behind a country without sufficient medical care may be 
leaving behind a just state that simply lacks sufficient medical resources through no 
fault of its own. Such was possibly the case with N, an HIV-positive woman who 
arrived in the UK in 1998, eventually requesting humanitarian protection on the 
grounds that she lacked access to anti-retroviral treatment in Uganda (Carter, 2008). 
Uganda was not necessarily unjust if it simply lacked the resources to provide HIV 
treatment to all. Assuming N was a refugee in the sense I defined – someone who has 
a right to remain because returning home is life-threatening – and assuming the UK 
could have easily permitted her to remain, she had a right to asylum even though she 
maintained citizenship in a just state. If she already had citizenship in a just state, she 
did not have a right to citizenship in the UK on these grounds alone.   
 
Perhaps the reason refugees like N have a right to citizenship is not because they lack 
citizenship in a just state, but because they lack access to the practice of citizenship in 
any state. When N arrived in the UK she relied on the UK’s National Health Services 
(NHS) to survive, and so could not move back to Uganda and access voting rights, an 
essential component of what it means to be a citizen. N therefore had a right to 
citizenship in the UK, ensuring she could be a citizen in practice, and not merely on 
paper. 8 
 
This argument, however, merely demonstrates that N had a right to vote in UK 
elections, and access the other benefits of citizenship, such welfare benefits, the ability 
to run for office, and assurance that she would not face deportation so long as she was 
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dependent on the NHS for survival. She could have a right to the benefits of citizenship 
while she was a refugee, and then lose these rights if these benefits became 
unnecessary when returning was safe.9  If such a policy would give her access to the 
practices associated with citizenship, then she did not have a right to citizenship itself, 
and so did not have a right to remain if returning home became safe.  
 
Rather than claiming refugees have a right to citizenship because of what they lost 
when they fled, perhaps refugees have a right to citizenship because of what they 
gained when they arrived.  
 
2.3 Social membership  
In general, individuals gain ‘social membership’ (Carens, 2013, p. 158; Miller, 2016, p. 123; 
Rubio-Marin, 2000, p. 8). after they have lived in a country for a significant number of 
years. If individuals are social members, they have come to interact with others in a 
manner that gives rise to certain moral claims. One claim is relational: if an individual 
has come to make new friends whom she is emotionally dependent on, and who are 
dependent on her, she has become an integral part of a relationship that is of value, 
and which gives rise to the claim to remain to continue this valuable relationship. 10 
Another moral claim is reciprocal: if an individual has paid taxes to the government 
for over a decade, or contributed to a local community center through volunteer work, 
she has a stronger claim to reap some of the benefits she has contributed in the past 
(Miller, 2016, p. 124). Some of these benefits cannot be reaped without citizenship, 
including the benefits of accessing welfare for as long as necessary, and the benefits of 
remaining to continue friendships, even when returning is safe.11 
 
Refugees who have fled their home countries have a right to remain for similar 
reasons. After some years have passed, they have likely developed social ties that give 
rise to moral claims which non-residents do not possess. Just as long-term residents 
have a right to remain, long-term refugees have a right to remain as well.12  
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This Social Membership Argument has been adopted in many wealthier countries. In 
the United States refugees can apply for permanent residency after a year, and then 
apply for citizenship if they have lived in the country as permanent residents for at 
least five years (U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services). In Germany all individuals, 
including refugees, are entitled to citizenship if they have lived in the country as a 
permanent resident for eight years and fulfill certain conditions, such as proof of 
integration via a naturalization test (Federal office of Migration and Refugees). If states 
allow long-term non-refugees to remain, they ought to allow long-term refugees to 
remain as well.  
 
There is a problem with the above reasoning. Even if states have a duty to provide 
citizenship to those who have lived in the country for many years, perhaps they 
needn’t let individuals remain in the country for many years. So long as states do not 
permit refugees to remain in one country for more than a given number of years, many 
refugees will not become social members, and so will not have a right to citizenship 
based on social membership alone. Nor would such a policy violate refugees’ right to 
protection: so long as some state was willing to provide a temporary visa, then 
refugees could maintain protection throughout the period when returning was unsafe. 
This would be possible if a given country provided refugee status for five years, after 
which another state took over providing asylum for an additional five years, followed 
by a third country if necessary, and so forth.  
 
A policy which required refugees to move every few years could be modeled after 
today’s guest worker programs, which allow migrant workers to remain in one 
country for a given number of years – often fewer than the years required for 
citizenship – after which workers leave and seek a visa elsewhere for a specified 
number of years. Indeed, if we view refugees as all individuals whose lives would be 
at risk if they returned home, including those at risk from life-threatening 
unemployment, we might view such guest worker programs as including short-term 
asylum. For example, Thailand, Japan, and Israel each offer short-visas to migrant 
workers, including some workers who would otherwise die of malnutrition without 
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such visas (Harding, 2016; OECD, 2011; Weiler et al, 2017). Thailand, Japan, and Israel can 
defend their requirement that migrants leave, even though they would die of 
malnutrition in their home countries, by claiming migrants can access another visa 
elsewhere once their visas lapse, and migrants have not stayed long enough to gain 
social membership locally.  
 
If such a policy is wrong, and we ought not force refugees to move from country to 
country every few years, a good theory will explain why.  
 
2.4 Plans  
The Plans Argument begins with a premise, supported by a range of philosophers, 
that a minimally decent life includes the ability to enter social, economic, and romantic 
relationships with others. Individuals struggle to gain these and other valuable 
relationships if they cannot remain where they are. They struggle to fulfill plans to 
enter professional relationships if they do not know where they will live tomorrow, 
and they struggle to form social relationships if they cannot remain in the same city, 
town, or neighborhood. Forcing individuals to leave can also undermine a range of 
basic abilities that enhance relationships with others, like the ability to spontaneously 
run into a new friend at the park one frequents regularly, or the ability to build up a 
business with loyal customers in one location. Just like we are dependent on 
continuing to own our computer, phone, or stove to write, call, or cook, we can be 
dependent on continuing to be in our homes, cities, or public spaces to live, work, and 
interact. If forcing individuals to leave their homes, cities, or public spaces undermines 
their abilities and plans, and others can protect these abilities and plans at negligible 
costs, then others have a duty to do so. Others should therefore permit individuals to 
remain when this involves negligible costs (Goodin, 1991, pp. 53-57; Nine, 2018; Stilz, 2011, 
pp. 582–87; Stilz, 2013, pp. 336-341).  
 
This broader claim has clear implications for refugees: just as it is wrong in general to 
force individuals to leave their current location, because this will destroy their plans 
and abilities to enter relationships with others, it is wrong to force refugees to leave 
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their first country of asylum, because this will destroy their plans and relationships 
with others. In other words, refugees have a right to remain not because of close ties 
they gained in a host state, but because they have a right to gain close ties in a host 
state.  
 
I believe this theory takes us closer to defending refugees’ right to remain. However, 
it would help if we had an additional theory explaining why the sorts of ties arising 
when one remains are better than the ties arising when one moves. In a world where 
refugees were required to move every five years, they could still gain some ties, 
entering romantic relationships lasting five years, friendships lasting five years, and 
employment contracts lasting five years. In such a world refugees could even plan for 
their future if they were aware they would leave after five years. While they could not 
plan for long-lasting attachments, they could at least gain temporary attachments for 
a limited period of time. If one holds that humans have a right to mere temporary 
attachments for a limited period of time, it seems refugees have no right to remain.   
 
In what follows, I explain why even temporary attachments are difficult to obtain 
when one moves every few years. Assuming that all humans at least have a right to 
short-term ties, refugees have a right to remain.  
 
3. Reciprocity  
This argument assumes, as stipulated in the introduction, that refugees are those 
whose right to life or liberty are undermined in their home countries. Having one’s 
life and liberty undermined is bad in itself, and this explains why refugees have a right 
to asylum. It is additionally bad because it undermines long-term attachments: it is 
difficult to marry, work, or form friendships if one is constantly escaping persecution 
and disaster. Finally, it is bad because it can undermine the ability to enter even short-
term relationships with others. This is because security and liberty are often essential 
for reciprocal relationships.  
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A reciprocal relationship, as I define it here, occurs when X provides an offer to Y with 
the expectation that Y will later provide an offer back, which Y later provides back 
with the expectation that X will later provide another offer back, which X later 
provides with the expectation that Y will later provide another offer back, and so forth. 
I put aside broader understandings of reciprocity, where X provides a good to Y which 
is proportionate to the good Y provided, but which X would have provided without 
the expectation that Y would again provide a good in the future.13 In the instances of 
reciprocity I have in mind, both X and Y would not provide their respective offers if 
they believed the other would not provide an offer back, and both are aware that the 
other would not provide their respective offers back if they believed the other would 
not provide an additional offer in turn.14  
 
For an example of such reciprocity, imagine an employer provides training to an 
employee with the expectation that the employee will continue to work, and the 
employee continues to work with the expectation of a promotion in the future, and the 
employer later provides a promotion with the expectation that the employee will 
remain in the company and work. Both the employer and employee are aware that the 
other is providing their respective goods with the expectation that she will provide 
her respective goods in return. Similarly, when a bank offers a loan, it does so with the 
expectation that the borrower will pay the money back, and the borrower will often 
pay the money back with the expectation that she can then qualify for another loan in 
the future, itself provided by the bank with the expectation that the borrower will pay 
the money back, which the borrower might do with the expectation of qualifying for 
a loan again in the future. Both parties are aware that the other party is acting as she 
does – or possibly acting as she does – with the expectation that the other will 
reciprocate.  
 
Reciprocal relationships are not limited to financial transactions. The awkward start 
of friendships and romances are full of reciprocity. If I want to be someone’s romantic 
partner, I might invite them out for a drink with the hope they will invite me for a 
drink in the future; had I been certain they would never ask me out later, I might be 
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less inclined to ask them out now. If I invited them out for a drink, and they wanted 
to enter a romantic relationship, they might invite me to another drink later, and 
would not have invited me for this other drink if they suspected I would not later 
reciprocate in turn, inviting them to some other event with the expectation they would 
invite me back, and so forth.  
 
If employment, loans, and romance are easier to develop with reciprocity, they are 
easier to develop with certain expectations of the future. The moment we think that 
another will not reciprocate in the future, we have less reason to reciprocate ourselves 
in the present, bringing the relationship to an end. One reason we might suppose 
another will not reciprocate in the future is that they will not be able to, such as when 
an employer suspects an employee will become ill, leave the city, or find a better job 
elsewhere. Another reason someone might not reciprocate is because we think they 
think we will not reciprocate. This can prevent even a short-term relationship from 
developing.  
 
For example, imagine you will remain the country for the next four years, and during 
this time you will have time to engage in 100 reciprocal transactions: I will give you a 
loan, you will pay this back with the expectation I will give you another loan, which 
you will also pay back with the expectation I will give you yet another loan, up until 
100 loans. I am less likely to give the 100th final loan if I think you are less likely to pay 
it back, on account of leaving after this final loan. If you know I will not give you this 
100th loan, you are less likely to pay back the 99th loan, knowing that you will not gain 
the 100th loan. If I know you are less likely to pay back the 99th loan, I am also less likely 
to give you this loan. If you know I will also not give you the 99th loan, you are also 
less likely to pay back this 98th loan, knowing there is no additional loan to come. I, in 
turn, am less likely to give you this 98th loan, and so forth, until there are no loans to 
give at all. The more we both know the precise end of our interactions, and the sooner 
this end is, the quicker and more likely this reciprocal relationship unravels, 
preventing any relationship at all. If we do not know the precise end, and suspect it 
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will continue indefinitely or for a long and unspecified time, the reciprocal 
relationship will be stronger and longer.15 
 
This knowledge that another will likely reciprocate in the future has been termed the 
‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 2006, Ch. 10).  If the shadow of the future helps 
individuals develop reciprocal relationships, and such relationships help individuals 
obtain even short-term financial, professional, and social relationships, then a shadow 
of the future helps individuals obtain short-term financial, professional, and social 
relationships.  
 
One of the disadvantages of living in a country with a high risk of death and 
persecution is that the shadow of the future is shorter, and so the possibility of 
relationships lower. A Nuer businesswoman in Juba who faces potential death by 
persecution will struggle to persuade a potential investor to provide investment for 
her small business, as the investor may be uncertain if she will be around to generate 
a profit later on. A farmer suffering from severe malnutrition in Burundi will struggle 
to obtain a loan to buy seeds, because a lender may be uncertain whether the farmer 
will survive until next season and pay him back. A student in Syria will struggle to 
obtain employment if an employer fears the student will flee bombs and terrorists at 
the first opportunity. Even if the businessman, farmer, and student have no plans to 
leave, it is enough that the investor, lender, and employer suspect they will leave for 
them to hesitate to provide them investments, loans, or employment. In other words, 
the problem is not merely that investment relationships are short-lived, or that loans 
are one-off, or that jobs are temporary: it is that any investments, loans, or jobs are 
difficult to obtain when the shadow of the future is short.  
 
Similar problems arise in forming new romantic relationships. If romance begins when 
one person invites another out for a coffee, with the hope that the other will 
reciprocate, romance can be difficult if the other will unlikely reciprocate because they 
may not be around the next day. The inability to predict the future, and the suspicion 
that the future will end with death or displacement, makes it difficult to enter 
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relationships that require prediction and stability. Without prediction and stability, 
the relationships are not merely short-lived: they can fail to take rise at all.  
 
Without such relationships, an important set of interests are set back. One interest is 
financial: when an individual has no access to credit, jobs, or romance, she may 
struggle to access food, shelter, and economic support.16 Another interest is intrinsic 
to the relationships themselves. There is a value in being part of a company where 
one’s work is valued enough to receive compensation in return, and this value cannot 
be replaced by receiving charity instead.17 There is value in taking a loan that one is 
confident one can pay back, and value in paying a loan back with the knowledge that 
one is credit-worthy to receive a loan in the future. Being declined credit comes with 
a shame that is beyond the frustration of having less capital to invest. And there is 
value in romance; few buy a potential partner dinner only to receive dinner back, and 
few are excited to give a gift because they expect a gift back. It is the relationships that 
dinners and gifts make possible that is of value, and not the dinner and gifts 
themselves.  
 
Just as the shadow of the future is important for reciprocity in home countries, the 
shadow of the future is important for reciprocity in host countries. For an employer to 
invest in training a refugee for a job, she must know the refugee will be around to 
produce profit for the firm in the future. For a bank to provide credit to a refugee, it 
must know the refugee will be around to pay the loan back. And for a potential long-
term romantic partner to invite a refugee out for a drink the first time, it helps if she 
knows the refugee will be around to offer a drink back, and to then accept another date 
even later, and then to offer another date later still, until the dating stage is over, and 
a more serious relationship unfolds.  
 
When refugees are forced to flee their home countries, and arrive in host countries, 
they are often caught between two worlds: one where they struggle to form reciprocal 
relationships in their home countries because others are not sure if they will survive, 
and another where they struggle to form reciprocal relationship in their host countries 
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because others are not sure if they will remain. If the reason refugees have a right to 
asylum is because they have a right to life and liberty, and securing life and liberty is 
valuable partly because it makes possible relationships, there is good reason to ensure 
that refugees can access relationships through reciprocity. The conditions for 
reciprocity are enhanced if citizens perceive a shadow of the future, in that they know 
refugees will likely remain, rather than be forced to leave any day.  
 
If this is true, there are two implications. One is that host states ought to permit 
refugees to remain so long as returning is unsafe, rather than requiring them to move 
from country to country every few years. Even if this policy ensures refugees’ survival, 
it denies them the shadow of the future for reciprocity, thus decreasing the chances of 
entering even short-term relationships with others.  
 
Moreover, it would be wrong to require that refugees return home once returning 
home is safe. This is because, if refugees are forever in a position where they can be 
required to return any day, this diminishes others’ willingness to enter reciprocal 
relationships in the present. This phenomenon was apparent in Israel, where I 
interviewed refugees from Eritrea who struggled to access credit, housing and the 
types of jobs requiring training. Creditors, landlords, and employers were uncertain 
that Eritrean refugees would be permitted to remain, and so were unsure whether 
refugees would be able to pay back loans, pay rent, or continue working in the future. 
Were creditors, landlords, and employers certain that refugees would be able to 
remain in the future, they would be more willing to provide them credit, housing, and 
jobs in the present. In other words, refugees ought to be given visas that extend into a 
period when returning is safe, so that they can enter reciprocal relationships when 
returning is unsafe. Only then will they have access to the reciprocity that makes even 
short-relationships possible, the sort of relationships that provide housing, finance, 
friendship, and range of other goods.  
 
It is important to emphasize that, though refugees have a right to the conditions of 
reciprocity, this right is not absolute. It might only arise if a state could provide these 
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conditions at below a given cost. If a state faced a large and sudden increase in the 
number of refugees arriving, and providing these refugees the right to remain entailed 
high costs, perhaps it would be permitted to sacrifice refugees’ access to reciprocity by 
requiring them to return home once returning was safe. In this sense, the right to 
remain is similar to other sorts of rights that refugees are given. Normally, we claim 
that refugees have a right to medical care and education, in that the state has a duty to 
provide them these rights if the costs fall below a given threshold. If a state faced a 
very large and sudden influx of refugees, perhaps it would be permitted to deny 
healthcare and education. But states that can provide healthcare and education at low 
costs have an obligation to do so, and cannot appeal to their right to control 
immigration to act otherwise. Similarly, states that can provide refugees visas to 
remain have an obligation to do so if costs fall below a given threshold, and cannot 
appeal to their right to control immigration to act otherwise.  
 
The above argument does not establish precisely how many years a government ought 
to allow refugees to remain after returning home is safe. We might imagine a 
government that permitted refugees to remain not indefinitely, but for five to ten years 
after returning was safe. This would create a relatively long shadow of the future 
during the period when returning was not safe, and if citizens were not certain when 
refugees would leave, this would help refugees to enter reciprocal relationships 
during this unsafe period. For example, in 1998 it was relatively safe for some 
Rwandan refugees to repatriate from Uganda, but the Ugandan government 
nonetheless permitted many Rwandan refugees to remain for several years longer, 
requiring them to return only in 2013.18 If all Ugandan citizens in 1994 were aware that 
Rwandans would never be forced to return without a five-years notice, and that some 
would be permitted to remain indefinitely, then Ugandan citizens would perceive a 
longer shadow of the future, encouraging them to enter reciprocal relationships with 
refugees when returning was still unsafe.    
 
Contrast this to Germany’ policy in 1995, when immediately after the Dayton Peace 
Accord it required all refugees from the former Yugoslavia to repatriate. Germany is 
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planning a similar policy for Syrian refugees, who will be required to return home the 
moment returning is safe (Martinovic, 2016). If the German government permitted 
refugees to remain for five to ten years after returning was safe, this would help 
Syrians access a range of relationships. A Syrian refugee living in Germany today 
could be confident that, even if Syria became safe tomorrow, she could stay for at least 
some years, and each German citizen could be confident that each Syrian refugee could 
stay for at least some years, encouraging enough of a shadow of the future for 
reciprocal relationships to unfold. 
 
If refugees have a right to remain in a single country, and the right to remain even 
when returning is safe, this has an important further implication: many refugees may 
live enough time in the country that they will become social members. Many will 
therefore begin to have claims to citizenship, and once they have citizenship, they will 
have a right to remain indefinitely. In other words, reciprocity explains why refugees 
have a right to remain for some time after returning is safe, and social membership 
explains why refugees are permitted to remain indefinitely once they have remained 
long enough. While not all refugees will remain long enough to become social 
members, many will.19  
 
For example, imagine that the Ugandan government assured all South Sudanese 
refugees currently in the country that, even if the South Sudanese Civil War ended 
tomorrow, they would have another five years to remain in Uganda. The Ugandan 
government would be creating a policy that allowed South Sudanese to live in Uganda 
for at least five years, and likely far longer. If refugees ended up living in Uganda for 
long enough, they would no longer have a mere right to remain for reciprocity alone, 
but because of the additional right to citizenship. And once they held this right, they 
would have a derivative right to remain indefinitely.   
 
4. Three objections 
There are, broadly speaking, three potential objections against the above argument.  
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4.1 Reciprocity is not very important 
Some might claim that the goods I describe – the goods of credit, jobs, romance, 
friendship, etc. – are not basic rights, and so even if refugees would benefit from the 
goods reciprocity provides, refugees do not have a right to remain. Or some might 
suppose reciprocity itself is not terribly important, even if it makes possible other 
goods we value.  One reason for supposing reciprocity is not important is that people 
voluntarily leave their homes, jobs, credit unions, and romantic partners all the time. 
If reciprocity truly had great value, then presumably individuals would declare in 
advance their intention of never leaving their homes, jobs, credit unions, and partners. 
Individuals rarely make such declarations.  
 
While individuals rarely declare their intention of never leaving their home, 
relationship, and so forth, they also rarely announce beforehand that they intend to 
soon leave their home, relationship, and so forth. New tenants rarely declare that they 
only intend to rent for six months, new employees rarely declare that they will 
definitely leave their job after a year, and new romantic partners rarely declare that 
they intend to leave their beau in exactly two years’ time. Even declaring, ‘I’ll probably 
break up with you in a decade’ is not to be advised. It is the chance that one will remain 
which provides a shadow of the future, and the higher the chance the longer the 
shadow. It is the chance that refugees will remain which provides citizens the shadow 
of the future, and the higher the chance the longer the shadow. If refugees have no or 
low chances of remaining when returning is safe, then refugees lack what many of us 
take for granted: the ability to easily form relationships dependent on reciprocity. 
 
Moreover, even if the sorts of relationships dependent on reciprocity are not basic 
rights – even if refugees do not have a right to romance, credit, jobs, and so forth – the 
options of trying to access romance, credit, and jobs are basic rights. More specifically, 
they are the sorts of rights widely accepted as belonging to refugees. It is widely 
accepted that refugees ought to be given the same legal rights afforded to temporary 
residents (da Costa, 2006), and temporary residents tend to have access to credit if a 
borrower is willing to lend, romance if a partner is willing to reciprocate, and jobs if 
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an employer is willing to hire. If refugees have a right to try accessing credit, romance, 
and jobs because these goods have value, but refugees lack the practical ability to 
access these goods because the shadow of the future is short, there is reason to extend 
this shadow and let refugees remain. In other words, just as refugees ought to be given 
the legal right to access a range of goods, refugees ought to be given the legal right to 
remain to access these goods.  
 
To see the force of this claim, it is worth comparing the right to remain with the right 
to movement within states. Imagine a refugee had the legal rights of residents – she 
could work if she found an employer, marry if she found a partner, worship if she 
found a mosque and so forth – except she could not leave a given remote town. Her 
access to the legal rights of residents would have little value if her town lacked 
businesses, social activities, places of worship, and other institutions that protected 
her ability to access jobs, make friends, and worship with co-religionists. Just as this 
spatial constraint makes her right to various goods of little value in practice, her 
temporal constraint – requiring that she leave within a specified number of years –
makes her right to various goods of little value in practice. This provides a good reason 
to lift this temporal constraint, giving her the right to remain.  
 
4.2 All individuals benefit from reciprocity 
There is a second objection to my argument. Some might note that all individuals 
benefit from reciprocity, including non-refugee students, migrants, tourists and so 
forth. If merely benefiting from reciprocity implied one had a right to reciprocity, and 
this implied one had a right to remain, then all students, migrants, and tourists would 
have a right to remain. This raises a problem: the entire purpose of this article was to 
consider why refugees have a right to remain even if others do not. If others do have 
a right to remain because of reciprocity, this implies that states do not have broad 
rights to control immigration. If we think states do have broad rights to control 
immigration, but refugees still have a right to remain, we must explain why. In other 




Though all benefit from reciprocity, this does not indicate that all individuals have a 
right to remain. This is because most individuals can access a relatively long shadow 
of the future in their home states, given that they do not face a high risk of death and 
displacement in their home states. If most can access reciprocity in their home states, 
then most can access at least short-term relationships in their home states, and so they 
do not have a right to remain in their adopted host states. This is similar to the 
approach we take regarding other government-provided rights. When I was a student 
in the UK I did not have a right to government-provided welfare provisions, because 
I could access such basic welfare in my home state. It is the fact that refugees cannot 
access welfare provisions in their home states – because they will risk death or 
persecution if they return – that partly explains why refugees have a right to welfare 
provisions in host states.  The same can be said about refugees’ right to reciprocity in 
host states.  
 
Of course, it may be that reciprocity is not like the right to welfare provisions; it is 
more comparable to the right to family life. A student usually has a right to bring their 
children and spouse with them if they study in a foreign country: the fact that they 
could access their family at home does not preclude their right to access family abroad. 
Perhaps the right to reciprocity is similar, and should be granted to all, thus giving all 
the right to remain. While this may be true, it remains the case that refugees’ particular 
inability to access reciprocity in their home countries provides one reason to permit 
them to remain, a reason that does not apply to others.  
 
4.3 Permits deporting citizens 
A final objection to my theory is that it seems to imply that, if states have broad right 
to control immigration, with an exception only given for those who cannot access 
reciprocity elsewhere, then a state would be permitted to require its own citizens to 
leave if they could find reciprocity abroad. The Canadian government could force a 
Canadian citizen to move to the US if this citizen also had US citizenship; the citizen 
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would not need a long shadow of the future in Canada if she could gain a long shadow 
in the US.  
 
This is not the implication of my argument, because there are other reasons individuals 
might have a right to conditions for reciprocity where they are. If an individual is a 
citizen in her current country of residence, then she might gain the right to reciprocity 
with her co-citizens, because reciprocity with one’s co-citizens has value distinct from 
reciprocity in general. My argument is simply that, if someone lacks reciprocity in 
general, because the risk of death and persecution in their home countries is high, they 
have a right to asylum that protects their access to reciprocity in general. This can be 
only obtained by remaining in their adopted country, a scenario applicable to refugees.  
 
5 Conclusion 
It is widely accepted that states have a right to control who enters their territory, but 
that refugees are an exception. If states have a general right to control immigration, 
but must accept refugees needing asylum, perhaps states may require that refugees 
return once no longer needing asylum.  
 
I presented an objection to this claim: refugees who have lived for many years in the 
country take on certain ties that give rise to new moral claims, including the claim to 
citizenship. With citizenship comes the right to remain indefinitely, even after 
returning is safe. This argument, commonly evoked in Western democracies, is 
incomplete: it does not establish why refugees have a right to remain in a given 
country during the period when they require asylum. We might imagine a policy 
where refugees were required to move from country to country every five years, 
forever obtaining asylum, but never obtaining the ties that are necessary for obtaining 
citizenship. We need an argument for why such a policy is wrong.  
 
One reason such a policy might be wrong is that, if refugees are required to move 
every five years, then they will struggle to plan for the future, and planning for the 
future is often necessary to build social relationships with others. Social relationships 
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have value, and so letting refugees remain has value. Though social relationships have 
value, it is not clear why refugees cannot gain social relationships that last a limited 
number of years, and plan for a future where they will be require to move every few 
years.  
 
I presented a novel argument that explained why such a policy would be wrong, and 
why refugees have a right to remain when returning is safe. Refugees have a right to 
remain in one country, and to remain when returning is safe, to develop reciprocal 
relationships during a period when remaining is unsafe. A refugee in Germany who 
cannot safely return to Syria will struggle to obtain a loan if a lender is not certain 
when the refugee will be required to leave. A refugee in Sudan who cannot safely 
return to Eritrea will struggle to start a romantic relationship if potential partners are 
uncertain when the refugee will be required to leave.  Refugees have a right to remain 
so that citizens can be fairly certain they will remain, assisting them to enter 
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1 When I write ‘widely accepted’ I mean that philosophers widely accept this claim, though of 
course non-philosophers may also widely accept this claim. For philosophers defending this 
claim, see Gibney, 2004; Miller, 2005; and Wellman, 2008. 
2 There is debate over why states must accept refugees, but one common reason is that states 
must accept refugees because they have humanitarian duties towards those outside their 
borders, and humanitarianism requires us to protect individuals at risk in their home countries. 
This moral responsibility, it is worth noting, is not the same as states’ legal responsibility. 
Legally, states need only provide protection to those fleeing persecution. For a defense of this 
moral rule, see Carens, 2013, pp 192-224; Gibney, 2004; Hidalgo, 2015; Miller 2005, p 202. It is 
worth nothing that some states also accept this moral responsibility, at least to an extent. See 
Betts, 2010. 
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3 It is worth noting that my argumentation may persuade you that refugees have a right to 
remain even if this undermines citizens’ access to survival. Nonetheless, my goal here is to 
demonstrate that refugees at least have a right to remain in the non-absolute sense, where the 
right can be overridden when it conflicts with some citizen needs.     
4 Carens is less explicit regarding this, but seems to suggest that restricting immigration may 
be justified to protect public order, even though today’s levels of restrictions far surpass what 
is necessary to protect public order.  
5 For example, of the millions currently fleeing Iraq and Syria, many are fleeing war rather than 
persecution based on their identity. See AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC), 
Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). 
6 For example, the Organization of African Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (1969, p. 3) provides asylum to those who are fleeing ‘external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order,’ including 
accidental events for which no agent is to blame. Similarly, the EU provides subsidiary 
protection to those who have fled general violence, and the Cartagena Declaration (1984, p. 36) 
in Latin America provides asylum to ‘persons who have fled their country because their lives, 
security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order.’  
7 For related arguments, see Owen, 2016 and Shacknove, 1985, pp. 278-280. 
8 I have never come across this particular argument, but Ruvi Ziegler defends refugees’ legal 
right to vote for a similar reason. See Ziegler, 2017. 
9  Some might suppose that providing voting rights without citizenship would create two 
classes of voters, and make those without citizenship susceptible to blackmail by those with 
full citizenship. This argument would require a broader discussion on blackmail, and when 
and why it is wrong, which I lack the space to address here.  
10 The reason that governments ought to grant citizenship based on how long an individual has 
lived in the country, and not literally based on how many friends they have, is because this is 
less intrusive; the government needn’t call up immigrants’ friends and romantic partners to 
find out just how good a friend and partner they are, deporting those who are mediocre friends 
and partners.  
11 This general principle – that social ties give rise to citizenship claims – is supported by a range 
of philosophers. See Carens, 2013, Ch. 8; Miller, 2016, Ch. 7; and Shachar, 2009, Ch. 6. 
12 A version of this argument has been raised by legal scholars. See Grahl-Madsen, 1972, p. 442, 
cited by Gil-Bazo, 2015. 
13 For example, Lawrence C. Becker writes that ‘Reciprocity is a matter of making a fitting and 
proportional return for the good or ill we receive.’ Similarly, Eva Kittay provides a broad 
conception of reciprocity distinct from the one I have in mind: ‘Just as we [ourselves] have 
required care to survive and thrive, so we need to provide conditions that allow others—
including those who do the work of caring—to receive the care they need to survive and thrive.’ 
See Becker, 2005, p. 18; Kittay, 1999, pp. 106-109; Sangiovanni, 2007, pp. 20-21. 
14 Others have noted that such reciprocity could have evolved throughout human biological 
history. My argument is not based on such empirical claims: I merely claim that some 
relationships depend on the sort of reciprocity described by evolutionary biologists and 
psychologists. See Axelrod, 2006. 
15 This is not merely theoretical. In the UK, lenders will rarely provide a loan to those who have 
fewer than five years on their visa, partly because those who have more than five years on their 
visa will have the option of later applying to remain indefinitely. The shorter the shadow of 
the future, and the more knowledge of precisely when the relationship will end, the less likely 
a lender will give any loan at all, let alone a succession of loans over a long period of time.   
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16 Of course, not all reciprocal relationships are in the interests of participants. A loan could 
leave the borrower in permanent or long-standing debt which makes her worse off than if no 
loan was provided at all. But it remains the case that access to regular loans can be essential to 
making ends meet or growing one’s business.  
17 On a broader understanding of reciprocity, charity could be thought of as reciprocal: If 
everyone gives to charity, then everyone will have access to charity should the need arise, even 
if few will literally receive charity from the individuals whom they donated to in the past. But 
even if charity is a form of indirect reciprocity, many still prefer not relying on charity, and 
prefer to be in employment with more direct reciprocity of the kind I have in mind.  For this 
reason, disability rights activists emphasize that those with disabilities should not simply be 
given food, shelter, and care; they should be given the opportunity to contribute to society and 
be compensated for such contribution, assuming such reciprocity is possible. For a discussion 
on indirect reciprocity in the form of charity, see Becker 2005 at 20-21. For a discussion disability 
rights and charity, see Bickenbach, 2012, pp. 67-137, especially 92-95; Fleischer and Zames, 
2001; O’Reilly, 2017. 
18 It is important to note that in 2013 many were required to repatriate who would face life-
threatening conditions in Rwanda, and so Uganda hardly implemented a just refugee policy. 
It nonetheless is true that some refugees could have returned earlier, but were not forced to do 
so until 2013 (Kingston, 2017). 
19 Precisely how many will depend on how long the conditions in home countries remain 
unsafe. As of 2018, at least half of all refugees have been in exile for over four years, and many 
in the other half only returned due to unjust deportations and repatriation. So it seems likely 
that the majority of refugees, if they can remain in one location during their asylum because of 
the Reciprocity Argument, they can gain Citizenship based on the Social Membership 
Argument. For a discussion on the number of years refugees remain in exile, see Devictor and 
Do, 2016. 
